

**Course syllabus and Description**  
**«POST-SOVIET EURASIA AND SCO: SOCIETY, POLITICS, INTEGRATION»**

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**General course information:**

This course is designed for students in the international Masters program with concentrations in Political Science and International Relations. This mandatory course is taught in the second half of the academic year. The total lecture time for the course is 30 hours and 8 hours of seminars. The final evaluation will be based on the research project carried out by the student.

**Prerequisites:**

The course does not have specific prerequisites though certain knowledge of Soviet History and International Relations, as well as Geography of Eurasia will be a plus.

**The READING** for the course is provided in a READER. Besides, some materials will be distributed via e-mail.

The class will meet twice a week. Typically, there will be structured discussions of the material covered in the corresponding section. Attendance and participation in the classes and discussion session are required.

**Note:** **political developments in Eurasia are quite rapid, so that scholarly publications often don't catch up. Changes will be included only under the category recommended literature.**

**Course objectives:**

To create a systematized conception of the current and future conditions of international relations in the post-soviet arena, to describe the external strategy of the main regional players, to analyze the dynamics of developments in the sub-regions of Eurasia, to analyze the most acute international political problems of the region.

**Course goals:**

As a result of study, the student should have:

- Knowledge: of goals and tasks of international relations in the eastern part of Eurasia from 1990 to the present; of the foreign policy strategies of the main players in the region.
- Ability: to use statistical data and academic, reference, and historical literature on the given theme to analyze conflicting situations in the region, foreign policy initiatives and economic interests of the main countries, and prospective future development of the region as a whole.
- Awareness: a conception of current problems facing the Asian part of the post-Soviet space and neighboring states, including those problems under discussion that call forth opposition among the main participants, and possible methods of their resolution.
- Skills: to critically evaluate analytical and scientific materials on the given issues.

**Methods of evaluation:**

- a) Continuous: examination of students during the course of lectures; return to the given material ;
- b) Final: test (with account of previous observations and appearance in lectures as in seminars).

The student's independent work: assimilation of the theoretical material and information received in the course of the lectures, learning the works of domestic and

foreign authors on the given problems, preparation for an essay on a chosen theme.

**The course concludes with an essay describing the results of students' research.**

Final grade is calculated from grades for:

- Essay—0.7;
- Lecture attendance—0.3;

For each of the above aspects of evaluation the student receives, correspondingly, on a 10-point scale:

- For essay— $0.7 \times Q1$ ;
- For lecture attendance— $0.3 \times Q2$ ;

where  $Q1$ ,  $Q2$  are grades on a 10-point scale.

## **EXPLANATORY NOTE**

### **Novelty of the course**

The proposed course is new for SU-HSE and is created specially for students of the university's new international political science master's program. In contrast to international relations courses offered at other Russian universities, it is dedicated exclusively to Asia and the SCO, and constructed according to the geographical and problem principle. Many of the topics included in the course lend themselves to discussion and debate, so different points of view on different problems are provided as much as possible in the recommended literature.

### **Course framework**

In recent years, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has become a major factor in the sphere of international relations in Eurasia. It unites the countries that are close to each other in the terms of their political and economic model and is able to influence the developments in this part of the world. This region has enormous human and natural resources and is capable of rapid economic development. Often, the SCO is viewed as an organization that is capable of becoming a world center for political and economic integration. Below follows an analysis of the opportunities to augment political, economic, and military cooperation within the SCO. Furthermore, it is proposed to analyze the likelihood that the SCO will realize its aspirations and potential and become a political and military counterbalance to the West.

## **1. Potential for political cooperation**

An important function of the SCO is discussing and resolving the political questions and problems of Central Asia.<sup>1</sup> Using the SCO as a platform, its members can coordinate mutually beneficial actions on important issues. Furthermore, the members can act in unity if the necessity arises. There are two important points of political cooperation within the framework of the SCO: (1 - explicit) the “war on terror” and regional security; (2 - implicit) counteracting the burgeoning influence of the US and NATO in the region. A more profound analysis of these two topics follows:

### **1.1 Terrorism and security**

The shared threat of terrorism and Islamic extremism unite the members of the SCO. This is a costly problem in the Northern Caucasus, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Xinjiang - Ugric autonomous region of the PRC. SCO member-states recognize the transnational characteristics of this threat and actively cooperate in counteracting it. Hence, this mutual threat and the cooperation to counteract it create the basis for further political cooperation concerning other topics.

Similarly, since April 2006, SCO members have combined efforts in the fight against illegal transnational drug trafficking. A significant portion of the world drug trade (especially of opiates) is routed through the territories of SCO member nations. Countries neighboring the SCO have used income from the sale of drugs, in part, to finance terrorist and extremist activities. Cooperation in the battle against drug trafficking has naturally expanded the political cooperation amongst SCO nations.

Another common problem that SCO member nations deal with is separatism. Russia is dealing with such problems in the Northern Caucasus, the PRC is dealing with similar problems in Xinjiang, and Central Asian nations are plagued by intermittent internal instability. The SCO countries support each other in the fight against separatism, although it should be noted that the line between terrorism and separatism in modern times is quite blurred, and SCO member-states prefer to discuss cooperation on the topic of the “war on terrorism”.

Cooperation between SCO member-states in the aforementioned regions is increasing and will, it seems, continue to do so in the future. All member-states are interested in regional stability and territorial integrity; hence, the SCO will continue to play a major role in the development of political cooperation in Central Asia.

### **1.2 Controlling the growth of the US’s regional influence**

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<sup>1</sup> As well as Mongolia and bordering states of the PRC

SCO member-states have increased cooperation amongst themselves with the goal of restricting US expansion in the region. The SCO includes more than half of the world's population and, from the perspective of the US, are authoritarian regions, in one way or another. SCO member-states are distrustful of US interventionist policies and insist on the development of multi-polar world. Such conditions create a certain foundation for SCO member-state cooperation against US influence in the region and for the expulsion of the US from Central Asia.

In this context, it is important to note that the leading SCO member-states (the PRC and Russia) have entered a period of collaboration. Russia resents the multinational cooperation to its west (including the growth of NATO and the EU) and cannot allow simultaneous negative relations with its eastern neighbors. The PRC is seeking new, reliable energy suppliers for its booming economy; it has complex relations with Japan and the US (because of the Taiwan issue) and also prefers to have stable north and west fronts. The international interests of Russian and the PRC supplement each other well; the two aforementioned nations have entered into strategic cooperation. Russia considers the Taiwan issue an "internal issue" of the PRC, while the PRC acts with understanding in regards to Russia's operations in the Caucasus. Russia is interested in reestablishing its political positions in Central Asia, but the PRC would like to see Central Asia as a reliable energy supplier and politically stable region. Both countries share the opinion the United States should not have a presence in Central Asia.

It is understood that the SCO's intention to become a counterbalance to the expansion of American influence in Central Asia has not gone unnoticed by Iran. Iranian President Ahmadinejad did not beat about the bush about when he said, "We want this organization to develop into a powerful body influential in regional and international politics, economics and trade, serving to block threats and unlawful strong-arm interference from various countries."<sup>2</sup> The decision of the PRC and Russia to offer Iran the status of observer in the SCO, undoubtedly, had anti-American motivations - at least that is how it was interpreted by Rumsfeld, the US Defense Minister at the time. He reacted with indignation saying that it seemed strange to him that an organization that declared anti-terrorist campaign as its objective would invite the most terrorist country to participate in its work.

At the same time one should not overestimate the anti-American potential of SCO. First, SCO is much weaker than United States economically and militarily. Second, there is no complete confidence among SCO nations: the ruling elites of central Asia are not prepared to return under the political control of Russia (or fall under Chinese domination); Russia has certain concerns regarding the future of thinly populated Siberia which borders on the

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/06/15/iran-thurs.html?print>

overpopulated China; CPR deals not only with Russia, but with other nations as well and diversifies its energy imports. One can expect SCO to be sufficiently united to contain American interference in the region, but this unity will not suffice to challenge United States as an alternative center of power. .

## **2. Prospects for economic cooperation**

The SCO, in addition to solving political issues, is an important forum for the expansion of economic cooperation. As is imaginable, economic cooperation within the framework of the SCO will increase.

The most important arena of cooperation is undoubtedly energy. The PRC's demand for imported energy resources has been increasing, and its neighbors and fellow SCO member-states are rich in such resources - Russia, Iran, and Turkmenistan are the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup>, and 4<sup>th</sup> (respectively) in the world in terms of proven gas reserves. Russia is the second-largest oil exporter in the world, and Iran, despite its problematic relations with neighboring oil-producing Arab neighbors, is a member of OPEC.

China imported 20 million tons of oil in 1999. By 2010, it may import 100 million tons. By 2010, the PRC will suffer from a 10% supply deficit in drinkable fresh water. By 2020, China will not be able to internally supply itself in the following products: oil, steel, aluminum, sulfur, and other raw materials.<sup>3</sup> It is obvious that for the resource-rich SCO partners of the PRC, the PRC offers a strong market for their exports. It is possible for Russia to export to the PRC 25 to thirty billion cubic meters of gas, 15 to 18 billion kilowatts of electricity from its new hydroelectric power plants in Siberia, and 25 to 30 million tons of oil. Russia also plans to build several nuclear power plants in China. The PRC is discussing plans to construct new pipelines and engage in new oilfield exploration activities with its partners in the SCO (especially Kazakhstan).

Economic cooperation is gradually moving beyond the limits of border-trade and energy exports. In September 2003, SCO member-states signed a framework agreement on the development of economic cooperation, and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao offered to create an SCO free-trade zone with the strategic aim of economic cooperation.

The spine of SCO economic cooperation is formed by the Sino-Russian link. Russia is interested in the participation of China (on specific terms) in the development of its Far East. Russia actively exports technology into China; Russian specialists have been invited to construct the industrial parks in Harbin. Russia and China plan to build a bridge across the Amur in the Blagoveshensk region. Projects to create free-trade zones and shared ports

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<sup>3</sup> Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives. Russia and the Axis of Evil: Money, Ambition and U.S. Interests. Testimony by Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., Research Fellow, Russian and Eurasian Studies, House International Relations Committee Hearings February 26, 2003

exist between the two nations. The joint effort of China and Russia can significantly expand the transportation infrastructure of Eurasia, thus increasing the throughput ability of trade channels originating from Europe and ending in Asia and the Middle East.

Not only are post-Soviet Central Asia countries attracted by the trade and investment opportunities that China offers, they are interested in the successful Chinese model of socio-economic development. In general, the SCO member-states have mutually complementary needs: the PRC needs energy and raw materials, which the resource-rich neighbors boast; Russia and the Central Asian countries need investments, which China can offer. In this manner, it may be concluded that economic cooperation within the SCO framework will develop dynamically in the future.

### **3. Perspectives of the development of the SCO into a military block**

As is known, the SCO member-states actively cooperate amongst each other in the military and military-technical spheres. It should be remembered that at the foundation of the SCO was military-political collaboration - demilitarization of Sino-Soviet borders and the 1997 agreement between Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan regarding the reduction of troops across shared borders. In 2003, the first military training exercises transpired in Kazakhstan and Xinjiang under the framework of the SCO. Similarly, joint military exercises occurred between Russia and the PRC as well as between Russia and India, a country that has observer status in the SCO.

The deepening of military cooperation within the framework of the SCO may transform it into a military block in the future, but this type of transformation seems unrealistic today. First, cooperation between nations thus far has been of a political, not military, nature; the joint military exercises between the PRC and Russia were more a demonstration of the good-neighborly relations between the two than a militarily strengthening activity. Second, the transformation of the SCO into a military bloc does not align with the interests of its member-states. The PRC basically is interested in access to energy resources and political stability along its northern and western borders, Russia already has a military block with Central Asian nations within the framework of OTCS and has already witnessed its fragility (the exit and entry of Uzbekistan). In today's situation, the creation of a military pact would generally tie Russia to somebody else's conflict, rather than supply it with group support in the solution of its own problems. While SCO member-states are not on par with each other in terms of political and economic development, becoming interdependent, through a military pact, would be counterproductive. The SCO explicitly states the above claim; in April 2006, the permanent Russian representative to the SCO, Gregory Logvinov, claimed



that “in the SCO, there is no intended path to transform it into a military block.”<sup>4</sup>

#### **4. Probability of internal conflicts within the SCO**

While the SCO offers serious potential for the development of cooperation in the political and economic spheres, conditions for the weakening of the SCO's unity do exist. First, regardless of the growth of economic cooperation, the trade volume of the SCO is relatively modest. Turnover between Russia and China in 2006 was slightly under US\$30 billion. This is not a paltry sum; however, China's trade with the US and EU is about US\$200 billion and about US\$100 billion with South Korea.<sup>5</sup> In the economic sense, the PRC depends much more on its ties to the West, Japan, and Korea than on its trade within the SCO, and this situation is unlikely to rapidly change. Furthermore, the long-term, Russia seemingly will not be able to satisfy Chinese needs for technology imports. Projects involving the construction of pipelines to China are running into Central Asian governments' demands for concessions and privileges.

Nor is the cooperation of the two main powers in the region, Russia and the PRC, guaranteed. There is the problem of demographic pressure from China against the sparsely inhabited Far East and Eastern Siberia; perhaps this problem is exaggerated, but it cannot be completely taken out of the equation. The problem of the balance of power between the two countries grows serious. While Russia, in comparison with China, is the more technologically advanced country, this comparison is altered as China develops. China far outweighs Russia in economic might, and the possibility exists that China will become the stronger nation in technological and military terms as well. It is difficult to say how such a development would affect relations between the two countries, which suppose themselves the basis of the SCO. Moreover, the Central Asian nations may decide to balance the growing regional influence of the PRC and Russia by means of new partnerships. Something of the sort has already happened in the CIS, and could potentially occur within the SCO.

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#### **Conclusions**

The SCO arose comparatively recently, and has already succeeded in establishing cooperation among its members. The SCO nations' natural, human, financial, and technological resources compliment each other. Member states support one another in combating terrorism, extremism, and separatism. They also share an interest in limiting the influence of outside players (particularly the United State) in the region. In this connection, while the SCO surpasses such unions as NATO and the EU in aggregate

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<sup>4</sup> <http://www.rian.ru/world/relations/20060418/46535162.html>

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.chinapro.ru/archive/11/108/> (according to the Xinhua-provided data)

population, territory, and natural resources, it has at present no chance to become as powerful as either of those parties. The fundamental reason for this is that the main member states have their own separate strategic interests, which prevent them from tying themselves closely to the organization. Potential for military and close political union is currently inadequate, and intra-SCO economic ties remain quite modest compared to the member states' ties with external partners. Potential changes in the balance of power between Russia and China create a certain unpredictability. Consequently it may be supposed that the SCO will continue its development along the currently accepted lines of concrete cooperation in specific, limited spheres, rather than growing into a full political or military union.

## **Course syllabus**

### **TOPIC 1 – THE CHANGING GEOPOLITICS OF POST-SOVIET EURASIA**

*The Rise of the New States and Their International Orientation. Situation within CIS: constellations of countries and interests. Different levels of integration and disintegration. The Energy Factor in Eurasia: Domestic and International Dimensions. Russia's Security Policy in Asia. Political and Military Blocks – Collective Security Treaty and Shanghai Organization. Ukraine. The Russian-Belarus Union. The Baltic Republics.*

#### **Lecture 1 – Russia's Search for A New International Identity**

*Three identities as a source for Russian self-identification: Imperial, Soviet, Western. Historical origins of Russian policy in Asia. Russia in Central Asia and China in 19<sup>th</sup> century. Soviet policy of Integration in Asia. Conflict between two versions of communism. Centrifugal tendencies of 1980's. Belovezhskiy Agreements. Original scheme of CIS. Multi-speed Commonwealth. Russia between Europe and Asia today.*

##### *Reading:*

James Billington. *Russia in Search of Itself*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004, Ch. 3-5

Dmitri Trenin. *Getting Russia Right*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007 pp. 37 - 88

#### **Lecture 2 – The Rise of the New States and Their International Orientation**

*Integration and disintegration schemes on the Post-Soviet Space. Union state of Russia and Byelorussia. United Economic Space. Customs Union. Organization of the Security Agreement Treaty. Shanghai Cooperation Organization. GUAAM. League for Democracy. Baltic policies. Impact of the financial crisis on Post-Soviet Economy and Politics.*

*Reading:*

Dmitri Trenin. *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002, Ch. 2-6

Alexei Arbatov. *Russia: a Special Imperial way?* *Russia in Global Affairs* January - March 2006.

J. Helmer. *Russia's Energy Model Challenges OPEC*. *Asia Times*, 18 July 2006

Sergei Lavrov. *The Rise of Asia and Eastern Vector of Russia's Policy*. [Russia in Global Affairs". № 3, July - September 2006](#)

Sherman Garnett. *The Keystone in the Arch. Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment in Central and Eastern Europe*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997

Robert Legvold (Ed.) *Thinking Strategically. The Major Powers, Kazakhstan and Central Asian Nations Nexus*. (An American Academy of Arts and Sciences Series). Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, 2003, Ch. 2-4, 6.

David Marples. *Russia-Belarus: the Complex Relationship.*, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, 06/07/2005

### **Lecture 3 – American, European and Chinese Policies in Eurasia**

*Evolution of American policy toward Central Asia. Chinese strategies and Peaceful Rise doctrine. Russian-Chinese controversies over Central Asia. Indian "Look East" Policy. NATO operation in Afghanistan and its impact on the situation in Central Asia. EU in Central Asia – an unaccomplished player.*

*Reading:*

Zbigniew Brzezinski. *The Grand Chessboard*. (Various editions).

Henry Kissinger. *Diplomacy* (section on the New World Order). Various editions.

Samuel Huntington. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*. (Sections dealing with Russia and Eurasia). Various editions.

Strobe Talbott. *The Russia Hand*.

Janusz Bugajski. *Cold Peace*.

Sergei Medvedev, *EU-Russia Relations: Alternative Futures*. Helsinki, UPI, 2006

Sergei Karaganov. *Dangerous Relapses*.

Sergei Karaganov. *New Contours of the World Order*. [Russia in Global Affairs". № 4, October - December 2005](#)

### **Lecture 4 – Whither the Russian Political System?**

*Is the Russian Political Model Exportable? Attractiveness and weakness of the Russian model. Common legacy of the Empire and challenges of independent*

*development. Strategy of modernization, its economic, societal and political aspects.*

*Reading:*

Lilia Shevtsova and Arch Tait. *Russia - Lost in Transition: The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies*: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007. Introduction, Conclusion.

Michael McFaul, Nikolay Petrov and Andrei Ryabov. *Between Dictatorship and democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International peace, 2004

Vladislav Surkov Divides Democracy. *Kommersant*. June 2006

## **Lecture 5 – How Solid Are the Authoritarian Regimes? The Phenomenon of Unrecognized States**

*Characteristics of Authoritarian Rule. Main types of authoritarian state. Autocracy. Oligarchy. Military junta. Single-party state. Variation in state goals and state-society relations among authoritarian regimes. How do modern authoritarian regimes differ from the old ones. Specific characteristic of regimes in modern Central Asia. The issue of inheritance. Social structure of societies and limitations on authoritarian policies. Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh. Common and different conflicts. War in Transdnistria. Russian-Georgian war in Ossetia. Armenian – Azerbaijani war in Nagorno-Karabakh. Eternal intervention. Role of international organizations and regional powers. Perspectives of the settlement/*

*Reading:*

David Nalle. *Kazakhstan, Unfulfilled Promise*. (book review): *Middle East Policy* July , 2005

Margarita Balmaceda, James I.Clem and Lisbeth L.Tarlow. *Independent Belarus: Domestic determinants, Regional Dynamics, and Implications for the West*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002 Ch. 2, 4.

Benjamin Smith. *Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World*. *American Journal of Political Science*, April 2004, 232 - 46

Vladimir Degoyev, Rustam Ibragimov, *The North Caucasus and the Future of Russian Statehood*. [Russia in Global Affairs". № 1, January - March 2006](#)

Gail W. Lapidus. *The War in Chechnya*.(general info)

Dov Lynch. *Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States*. Washington: U.D.Institute of Peace, 2004, pp. 4 - 46

## **Lecture 6 – Attempts at Economic Modernization and Its Obstacles**

*Before Modernization. Causes of Modernization. The “Great Reforms”. Reforms after the Crimean War. Industrialization. Effects of Industrialization. Stalin’s Modernization. Mobilization versus gradual development. Scientific Revolution. Competition between liberal and Soviet models in competitiveness. Today’s Russia: Modernization as a must. Social, Political, Economic aspects of Modernization. Technocratic and complex vision of the issue.*

#### *Reading*

Anders Aslund. *How Capitalism Was Built: The Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia*. 2007. Ch. 2-4

David Hoffman. *The Oligarchs. Wealth and Power in the New Russia*. N.Y.: Public Affairs, 2002. pp. 177 – 325.

### **Lecture 7 – The Energy Factor in Eurasia: Domestic and International Dimensions. The Caspian and Central Asia**

*Securitization of Energy Supplies. Global competition for the transportation routes. State and Private interests in energy strategies. Energy as a source of wealth and Energy as a source of power. Energy wealth and types of political regimes. Energy in exchange for institutions. Legal aspects of the Caspian divide. Maritime nations’ interests. Transportation routes. Biodiversity. Transportation hub. Caspian as a crossroads of civilizations. Water – Energy balance: the interests of the highlands and lowlands. Fergana valley. Drug trafficking. Islamic extremism in the region. Prospects of cooperation in the region.*

#### *Reading:*

Cliff Gaddy, Fiona Hill. *The Siberian Curse*. Brookings, 2004

Matha Olcott. *Vladimir Putin and Russia’s Energy Policy*. Carnegie Moscow Center Working Paper, #1, 2005

### **Lecture 8 – Ethnic Conflicts, Islamist Radicalism, Terrorism and Other New Threats**

*General theory of conflicts. Conflict management issues. Third parties’ roles. Un and regional organizations in conflict management. Resolution of conflicts. Post-conflict settlements. Arms trafficking and resource-based conflicts. Russian participation in conflict resolution under CIS auspices. Chechnya and Northern Caucasus conflicts. Central Asia conflict: cases of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. New Khalifat.*

*Social routes of terrorism in the Russian South. Evolution of Russian Strategies in fighting terrorism.*

### *Reading*

Thomas de Waal. *Black Garden. Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War*. N.Y.: New York University Press, 2003. Introduction, Conclusion.

Igor Zevelev. *Russia and Its New Diasporas*. Washington: U.S.Institute of Peace, 2001 Ch. 2.

Yevgeny M. Primakov, and Henry Kissinger. *A World Challenged. Fighting Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century*. Brookings, 2004. Ch. 2, 4-6.

Martha Olcott and Bakhtiyar Babajanov. *Notes of A Terrorist*. *Foreign Policy*, March-April, 2003

Lawrence Freedman. *War. Foreign Policy*, July-August 2003

## **Suggested Research Topics**

1. Security regimes in Eurasia.
2. Major problems facing Caspian countries.
3. Political order in the countries of Central Asia, their foreign policy strategies.
4. Goals of external players in the Caspian region.
5. Conflicts in the Caucasus.
6. Political perspectives of SCO.
7. Western part of Post-Soviet Space: Political vectors of Byelorussia and Ukraine.
8. Evolution of Russian – Chinese relations.
9. Security threats in Eurasia.
10. Eurasia in world politics.
11. Geopolitical divisions in Eurasia.
12. Economic perspectives of SCO.
13. Iran in the policies of Eurasian nations.
14. Political aspects of energy transportation in Eurasia.
15. Policies of transportation corridors in Eurasia.

**The students are invited to come up with their own topic of research!!!**

## **Course Schedule**

№	Topics	Contact Hours	Homework	
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№		Lectures	Seminars	Total		
1	Russia's Search for a New International Identity	2		2	2	4
2	The Rise of the New States and Their International Orientation	2		2	2	4
3	American, European and Chinese Policies in Eurasia (1)	2		2	2	4
4	American, European and Chinese Policies in Eurasia (2)	2		2	2	4
5	<i>Prospects for the Post-Soviet Space</i>		2	2	4	6
6	Whither the Russian Political System?	2		2	2	4
7	Orange Revolutions: Georgia and Ukraine	2		2	2	4
8	How Solid Are the Authoritarian Regimes?	2		2	2	4
9	The Phenomenon of Unrecognized States (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdnestrria, Nagorno-Karabakh) and Their Role	2		2	2	4
10	<i>The Prospects for Democracy in the CIS States</i>		2	2	4	6
11	Attempts at Economic Modernization and Its Obstacles	2		2	2	4
12	The Energy Factor in Eurasia: Domestic and International Dimensions	2		2	2	4
13	The Caspian and Central Asia – Knots of Problems	2		2	2	4
14	<i>Economic and Social Prospects for Russia and the New States</i>		2	2	4	6
15	Russian/Soviet Strategic Culture(s) and Threat Perceptions	2		2	2	4

16	Ethnic Conflicts	2		2	2	4
17	Islamist Radicalism, Terrorism and Other New Threats	2		2	2	4
18	Russia and the States of Concern	2		2	2	4
19	<i>The Future of Eurasia</i>		2	2	4	6
	Final			2	10	12
	Research Project			-	34	34
	Total	30	8	40	90	130

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